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Abstract
Self- contamination during doffing of personal protective equipment (PPE) is a con-
cern for healthcare workers (HCW) following SARS- CoV- 2- positive patient care. Staff 
may subconsciously become contaminated through improper glove removal; so, quan-
tifying this exposure is critical for safe working procedures. HCW surface contact se-
quences on a respiratory ward were modeled using a discrete- time Markov chain for: 
IV- drip care, blood pressure monitoring, and doctors’ rounds. Accretion of viral RNA 
on gloves during care was modeled using a stochastic recurrence relation. In the simu-
lation, the HCW then doffed PPE and contaminated themselves in a fraction of cases 
based on increasing caseload. A parametric study was conducted to analyze the ef-
fect of: (1a) increasing patient numbers on the ward, (1b) the proportion of COVID- 19 
cases, (2) the length of a shift, and (3) the probability of touching contaminated PPE. 
The driving factors for the exposure were surface contamination and the number of 
surface contacts. The results simulate generally low viral exposures in most of the 
scenarios considered including on 100% COVID- 19 positive wards, although this is 
where the highest self- inoculated dose is likely to occur with median 0.0305 viruses 
(95% CI =0– 0.6 viruses). Dose correlates highly with surface contamination showing 
that this can be a determining factor for the exposure. The infection risk resulting 
from the exposure is challenging to estimate, as it will be influenced by the factors 
such as virus variant and vaccination rates.
K E Y W O R D S
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1  |  INTRODUC TION
Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS- CoV- 2) is an 
enveloped virus which has infected in excess of 200 million people to 
date and caused more than four million deaths worldwide according 
to Johns Hopkins University's COVID- 19 dashboard.1 Inanimate ob-
jects known as fomites may host pathogens and have the potential to 
contribute to transmission in healthcare environments. This occurs 
in viral contamination spread2– 4 including SARS- CoV- 2.5,6 However, 
it should be noted that there are uncertainties as to the relationship 
between the molecularly detected viruses and infectious viruses. In 
terms of persistence, there appears to be a similarity between SARS- 
CoV- 1 and 2 on surfaces, where initial concentrations of 103.7 me-
dian tissue culture infectious dose (TCID50)/ml (SARS- CoV- 2) and of 
103.4 TCID50/ml (SARS- 1) reduced to 10
0.6 TCID50/ml (SARS- CoV- 2) 
and 100.7 TCID50/ml (SARS- 1), respectively, due to the decay of vi-
ability of the virus after 72 h on plastic surfaces.7 Persistence on the 
scale of days under heavy contamination conditions allows an op-
portunity for exposure through hand- to- fomite contacts. Although 
personal protective equipment (PPE) such as gloves, gowns, and 
masks are worn to protect both patients and healthcare workers 
(HCW) from the exposure, self- contamination during PPE doff-
ing processes8,9 poses risks to HCW and enables spread from one 
patient to another during multiple care episodes. SARS- CoV- 2 has 
been detected on healthcare worker PPE10 and in the environment 
of rooms where doffing occurs, demonstrating that errors in doffing 
could facilitate COVID- 19 exposure and transmission.
While SARS- CoV- 2 has been detected on PPE and patient sur-
faces, the relationship between viral RNA concentrations and risk 
of infection is still unknown.11 Bullard et al.12 present TCID50 and 
cycle threshold values relative to days since symptom onset, but 
these may not be translatable to concentrations on fomites due to 
the potential for more SARS- CoV- 2- genetic material corresponding 
to inactivated viruses resulting from incomplete surface disinfection 
practices. Quantitative microbial risk assessments (QMRA) involve 
the use of mathematical models to estimate doses of a pathogen 
and subsequent infection risk probabilities. Quantifying infection 
exposure and risk for any given dose can be used to guide inter-
vention decision- making and have been used in other public health 
contexts, such as in setting water quality standards.13 These typi-
cally rely on experimental doses of a microorganism inoculated into 
healthy participants or mice models in a known quantity. Whether 
they develop the infection can then be recorded.13 QMRA model-
ing and surface contact models have been used to evaluate multiple 
transmission pathways. The role of care- specific behaviors in en-
vironmental microbial spread14 includes the effect of glove use in 
bacterial spread from one surface to another15 and evaluating risk 
reductions through hand hygiene or surface disinfection interven-
tions.16– 18 While a strength of QMRA is related to environmental 
monitoring data to health outcomes, a common limitation is the lack 
of specific human behavior data such as hand- to- face or hand- to- 
surface contact sequences that result in dose exposures.18,19 The 
use of the QMRA modeling framework incorporating care type 
surface contact patterns before potential self- contamination via PPE 
doffing will offer insight into viral exposure per shift.
The objective of this study is to relate SARS- CoV- 2 concen-
trations on surfaces to predict the exposure of a single healthcare 
worker over an 8- hour shift and estimate the effects of doffing mis-
takes and number of care episodes per shift on inoculated dose per 
shift.
2  |  METHODOLOGY
This approach combines human behavior and fomite- mediated ex-
posure models of 19 hospital scenarios, for which concentrations 
of SARS- CoV- 2 on hands and infection risk for a single shift are 
estimated for a registered nurse, an auxiliary nurse, and a doctor. 
A control scenario was defined as a single episode of care with a 
SARS- CoV- 2- positive individual with an assumed 80% probability of 
self- contamination during doffing: a “worst- case scenario.” Eighteen 
other scenarios covered three likelihoods of self- contamination: 
10%, 50%, and 80%, ×2 caseload conditions: 7 patients (low) vs. 14 
patients (high) × 3 probabilities of any given patient being COVID- 19 
positive: low (5%), medium (50%), and a 100% COVID- 19- positive 
ward. These rates of self- contamination during doffing were as-
sumed due to uncertainty as to how workload and stress, especially 
under pandemic conditions, would influence doffing. Exploring 
probabilities of self- contamination as low as 5% and as high as 80% 
allows for the exploration of optimistic and worse- case scenarios.
During low caseload conditions, it was assumed that the number 
of care episodes per shift would be less7 than that of the high load 
conditions.14 The assumed number of patient care episodes when 
PPE is worn per shift for low and high caseload scenarios were 7 and 
14, respectively, based on a respiratory ward in a university teach-
ing hospital in the UK. The low caseload estimate was based on the 
communication with a UK NHS consultant, who tracked the num-
ber of gowns used by healthcare workers over a week on a mixed 
COVID- 19 8- bed respiratory ward. All model parameters are de-
scribed and reported in Table 1. Per scenario, three simulations were 
Practical Implications
Infection risk from self- contamination during doffing PPE 
is an important concern in healthcare settings, especially 
on a COVID- 19 ward. Fatigue during high workload shifts 
may result in an increased frequency of mistakes and hence 
the risk of exposure. Length of staff shift and a number 
of COVID- 19 patients on a ward correlate positively with 
the risk to staff through self- contamination after doffing. 
Cleaning of far- patient surfaces is equally important as 
cleaning traditional “high- touch surfaces,” given that there 
is an additional risk from bioaerosol deposition outside the 
patient zone.
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run where sequences of hand- surface contacts per care episode 
were care- specific (IV care, observational care, or doctors’ rounds).
2.1  |  Healthcare worker surface contact 
behavior sequences
Fifty episodes of mock patient care were recorded overtly using 
videography in a respiratory ward side room at St James’ Hospital, 
Leeds. Mock care was undertaken by doctors and nurses with a vol-
unteer from the research team to represent the patient. While these 
observations were carried out prior to COVID- 19, it is assumed that 
patient care would be similar for any infected patient, including a 
COVID- 19 patient. Ethical approval for the study was given by the 
NHS Health Research Authority Research Ethics Committee (London 
– Queen Square Research Ethics Committee), REF: 19/LO/0301. 
Sequences of surface contacts were recorded for three specific care 
types: IV drip insertion and subsequent care (IV, n = 17) conducted 
by registered nurses (RN); blood pressure, temperature, and oxygen 
saturation measurement (Observations, n = 20) conducted by aux-
iliary nurses; and doctors’ rounds (Rounds, n = 13). Data from care 
were used to generate representative contact patterns to model 
possible sequences of surface contacts by HCWs in a single patient 
room. Discrete Markov chains were used because HCWs were found 
to touch surfaces in a non- random manner, insofar that transitional 
probabilities fit to observed behaviors from moving from one sur-
face category were not all equal. By assigning each surface category 
a numerical value from 1 to 5, where Equipment = 1, Patient = 2, 
Hygiene areas = 3, Near- bed surfaces = 4, and Far- bed surfaces = 5, 
HCW sequential contact of surfaces can be modeled in terms of 
TA B L E  1  Model parameters and their distributions/point values
Parameter Distribution/point value Reference
Surface contamination (CRNA)
(RNA/swabbed surface area)
For infected patient scenarios
Surfaces:
Triangular (min = 3.3 × 103, mid=2.8 × 104, max=6.6 × 104)
Patient:
Point estimate: 3.3 × 103
28
Area of any given surface (Asurface) (cm
2) Triangular (min = 5, max = 195, mid = 100) Assumed
Fraction of RNA (infective)
assumed to be infectious
Uniform (min = 0.001, max = 0.1) Assumed
Finger- to- surface transfer efficiency (β) (fraction) Normal (mean = 0.118, SD = 0.088)
Left- and right- truncated at 0 and 1, respectively
4
Surface- to- finger transfer efficiency (λ) (fraction) Normal (mean = 0.123, SD = 0.068)
Left- and right- truncated at 0 and 1, respectively
4
Finger- to- mouth transfer efficiency (TEHⓇM) (fraction) Normal (mean = 0.339, SD = 0.1318)
Left- and right- truncated at 0 and 1, respectively
50
Glove doffing self- contamination transfer efficiency Uniform (min = 3 × 10−7, max = 0.1) 8
T99 on Hands
(h) used for calculating inactivation constants
Uniform
(min = 1, max = 8)
24, 51
T50 on surfaces
(h) used for calculating inactivation constants
Uniform
(min = 4.59, max = 8.17)
7
Hand hygiene efficacy: alcohol gel (log10 reduction) Uniform (min = 2, max = 4) 35
Hand hygiene efficacy: soap and water (log10 reduction) Normal (mean = 1.62, SD = 0.12)
Left- and right- truncated at 0 and 4, respectively
34
Fraction of total hand surface area for hand- to- mouth or 
hand- to- surface contacts (Sm and Sh)
For in/out events:
Uniform (min = 0.10, max = 0.17)
For patient contacts:
Uniform (min = 0.04, max = 0.25)
For other surface contacts:
Uniform (min = 0.008, max = 0.25)
For hand- to- face contacts:
Uniform (min = 0.008, max = 0.012)
26
Total hand surface area (Ah) (cm
2) Uniform (min = 445, max = 535) 19, 38








aDose response curve parameters are to be used in bootstrapped pairs. Mean ± SD and minimum and maximum are provided to offer context as to 
the magnitude of these parameters.
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weighted probabilities.14 More information regarding the observa-
tion of these behaviors and analysis of sequences of events can be 
seen in King et al.20
The transition of an HCW between surface contacts is mod-
eled using a discrete- time Markov chain approach.14 Using defined 
weighted probabilities based on observation of patient care, surface 
contact by HCW can be simulated based on the property that given 
the present state, the future and past surfaces touched are indepen-
dent. This is termed as the Markov property (Equation 1):
where Xn represents the surface contacted in the nth event, i and j are 
two surfaces, and P represents a conditional probability. This is then 
denoted as Pj→i for the ease of notation. For example, the probability 
if the HCW is currently touching the table and they will next touch 
the chair is Ptable→chair and can be worked out by counting the number 
of times this happens during care divided by the number of times any 
surface is touched after the table.21
Discrete- time Markov chains were fitted to observed care con-
tact sequences using the “Markov chain Fit” function from the R 
package Markov chain (version 0.7.0). Separate Markov chains were 
fitted to IV care, doctors’ rounds, and observational care sequences. 
States included “in” (entrance to the patient room), “out” (exit from 
the patient room), contact with a far- patient surface, contact with a 
near- patient surface, contact with a hygiene surface (e.g., tap, sink, 
soap, or alcohol dispenser), and contact with equipment. For each 
episode of care, the first event was the entrance into the patient's 
room. It was assumed in the simulation that all HCWs wore a gown, 
gloves, mask, and face shield when entering the room in that hand- 
to- face contacts were not modeled during the episodes of care, 
and hand hygiene moments only occurred after doffing in between 
the care episodes. The episode of care ended when an “out” event 
occurred.
2.2  |  Exposure model
Accretion of microorganism on hands from the surface contacts has 
been demonstrated14 to respond to a recurrence relationship with 
the concentration on hands after the nth contact, Ch
n
, with the con-
centration on hands, Ch
n−1
, and on the surface involved, Cs
n−1
, before 
the contact. See Equation (2).
This is an adaptation of the pathogen accretion model (PAM) 
from King et al.14 and a gradient transfer model by Julian et al.22 
Here, the concentration on hands for contact n is equal to the pre-
vious concentration on the hand (Ch
n−1
) after adjusting for inactiva-
tion for the virus on the hand (kh) and surface ks, minus the removal 
from the hand due to the hand- to- surface transfer plus the gain to 
the hand due to surface- to- hand transfer. Δt is the time taken for 
an episode of patient care and sampled from a uniform distribution 
of range 2– 20 min.23 Here,  and  represent hand- to- surface and 
surface- to- hand transfer efficiencies, respectively. The fraction of 
the total hand surface area (Sh) is used to estimate how much virus 
is available for transfer, given a concentration of the number of viral 
particles/cm2 on the gloved hand and surface.
2.3  |  Estimating inactivation on the hand
Sizun et al. evaluated the survival of human coronaviruses (HCoV) 
strains OC43 and 229E on latex glove material after drying. Within 
6 h, there was a reduction in viral infectivity for HCoV- 229E that we 
assume is equal to 99%.24 For HCV- OC43, a reduction of approxi-
mately 99% in viral infectivity occurred within an hour.24 Harbourt 
et al.25 measured SARS CoV- 2 inactivation on pig skin with virus re-
maining viable for up to 8 h at 37°C. We, therefore, used a uniform 
distribution with a minimum of 1 h and a maximum of 8 h to estimate 
a distribution of kh inactivation rates.
2.4  |  Estimating inactivation on surfaces
The decay of the virus causing COVID- 19 has been shown to vary 
under both humidity and temperature, but in contrast with the pre-
vious findings,7 it appears that the surface material may not have 
a large impact on the decay rate.25 We, therefore, use one distri-
bution of inactivation rates regardless of surface type by taking a 
conservative approach and using an averaged half- life τ estimate for 
stainless steel- and plastic- coated surfaces at 21– 23°C7 at 40% rela-
tive humidity, which are 5.63 h (95%CI = 4.59– 6.86 h) and 6.81 h 
(95%CI = 5.62– 8.17 h), respectively. We assume a first- order decay 
(Equation 3) to estimate the inactivation constant k which we use 
here for brevity instead of ks and kh in the Equation (2).
Surface viral concentration C at any given time t then depends 
uniquely on initial concentration C0. Where the half- life τ, is related 
to k by: ks = log(2)∕. Since the hospital rooms are made up of a com-
bination of stainless steel and plastic surfaces, we have taken the 
widest confidence interval as bounds when sampling from a uniform 
distribution for inactivation rate ks. Inactivation on gloves is assumed 
to be minimal for the time scale of a care episode (2– 20 min).23
2.5  |  Fractional surface area
For contacts with the door handle during “in” or “out” behaviors, a 
fractional surface area was randomly sampled from a uniform dis-
tribution with a minimum of 0.10 and a maximum of 0.17 for open 
hand grip hand- to- object contacts.26 For contacts with the patient, 
a fractional surface area was randomly sampled from a uniform 
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distribution with a minimum of 0.04 and a maximum of 0.25, for front 
partial finger or full front palm with finger contact configurations.26 
For contacts with other surfaces, the fractional surface areas were 
randomly sampled from a uniform distribution with a minimum of 
0.008 and a maximum of 0.25, spanning multiple contact and grip 
types from a single fingertip up to a full palm contact.26
2.6  |  Transfer efficiencies
All transfer efficiencies used in this model are unitless fractions 
ranging from 0 to 1, representing the fraction of viruses available for 
transfer that transfer from one surface to another upon contact. For 
contacts with surfaces other than the patient, a truncated normal 
distribution with a mean of 0.123 and a standard deviation of 0.068 
with maximum 1 and minimum 0 was randomly sampled for surface- 
to- finger (λ) transfer efficiencies based on aggregated averages of 
influenza, rhinovirus, and norovirus.4 For patient contacts, transfer 
efficiencies were randomly sampled from a normal distribution with 
a mean of 0.056 and a standard deviation of 0.032, left- and right- 
truncated at 0 and 1, respectively. The mean and standard deviation 
were informed by transfer efficiencies for rhinovirus measured for 
direct skin- to- skin contact.27 Transfer efficiencies from fingers to 
surfaces (β) are assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 
0.118 and a standard deviation of 0.088.4
2.7  |  Surface concentrations
If the patient was assumed to be infected, surface contamination 
levels (RNA/swab surface area) were sampled from a triangular 
distribution where the minimum and maximum were informed by 
minimum and maximum contamination levels reported for the sur-
faces in an intensive care unit ward.28 The median of these was used 
to inform the midpoint of the triangular distribution.28 For patient 
contacts, the concentration of virus detected on a patient mask was 
used as a point value (3.3 × 103RNA/swab surface area).28 When a 
patient was not infected, it was assumed that contacts with surfaces 
and with the patient would not contribute to additional accretion of 
the virus on gloved hands.
Surface areas for relating concentrations of RNA/swabbed surface 
area reported by Guo et al. (2020) to RNA/cm2 were not provided. 
While a typical sampling size is 100 cm2, it may be as small as 10– 
25 cm229– 32 and in the real- world scenarios, sampling surface areas 
may be larger or smaller than these depending upon available surface 
area, ease of access, and the contamination magnitude expected. 
Since the surface areas of these surfaces were not provided, a triangu-
lar distribution (min = 5, max = 195, mid = 100) describing the surface 
area (cm2) of surfaces sampled was used to estimate RNA/cm2. Not all 
detected RNA was assumed to represent infectious viral particles. This 
is a conservative risk approach when utilizing molecular concentration 
data in QMRA.33 Therefore, concentrations on surfaces CS (viable viral 
particles/cm2) were estimated by Equation (4),
where CRNA is the RNA/swabbed surface area, Asurface is the surface 
area (cm2) of the surface, and infective is the fraction of RNA that re-
lates to infective viral particles (uniform(min = 0.001, max = 0.1)). This 
overlaps with a range used by Jones (2020) for COVID- 19 modeling. 
While data from Bullard et al. (2020) exist for relating molecularly de-
tected SARS- CoV- 2 to culturable SARS- CoV- 2 for patient samples, 
these ratios do not translate to fomite scenarios where surface dis-
infection likely results in a more molecularly detectable viruses that 
do not translate to infectivity. Therefore, we did not use these data to 
inform our assumptions about viral infectivity for molecularly detected 
SARS- CoV- 2 on surfaces.
2.8  |  Estimating exposure dose
For all scenarios, it was assumed that the starting concentration on 
gloved hands for the first episode of care was equal to 0 viral par-
ticles/cm2. If gloves were doffed and a new pair was donned in be-
tween care episodes, it was assumed that the next episode of care 
began with a concentration of 0 viral particles/cm2 on the gloved 
hands. After each care episode, a number was randomly sampled 
from a uniform distribution with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 
1. If this value was less than or equal to the set probability of self- 
contamination during doffing, self- contamination occurred, where 
the fraction of total virus was transferred from the outer glove sur-
face to the hands was assumed to be uniformly distributed between 
3 × 10– 5% and 10%.8 There was then a 50/50 chance that either 
hand were washed or sanitized using alcohol gel due to the lack of 
available data describing proportions of hand hygiene attributable 
to these two methods occurring aftercare episodes. If they washed 
their hands, a log10 reduction was randomly sampled from a normal 
distribution with a mean of 1.62 and a standard deviation of 0.12 
(min = 0 and max = 6).34 While these are not coronavirus- specific 
handwashing efficacies they allow for a conservative estimate. If 
hand sanitizer was used, a log10 reduction was randomly sampled 
from a uniform distribution with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 
4.35
To estimate a dose, an expected concentration on the hands 
after doffing and hand hygiene was estimated, followed by an ex-
pected transfer to a facial mucosal membrane during a single hand- 
to- nose contact after each patient care episode (Equation 5).
There was a 50/50 chance that either the right or left hand was 
used for this hand- to- face contact, as contact patterns between 
right and left hands have been shown to lack statistically significant 
differences.36 Here, the transfer efficiency (TH→M) of the hand- to- 
nose contact was randomly sampled from a normal distribution with 





(5)D = Ch ⋅ TEHM ⋅ Sm ⋅ Ah ⋅ e−khΔt
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viral surrogate.37 These simulated nose contacts were assumed to be 
with the mucosal membrane as opposed to other parts of the nose, 
such as the bridge of the nose, that would not result in a dose. The 
fractional surface area of contact (Sm) was assumed to be equal to 
one fingertip. To estimate this surface area, the minimum and maxi-
mum front partial fingertip fractional surface areas were divided by 
5 to inform the minimum and maximum values of a uniform distribu-
tion.24 The surface area of a hand (Ah) was randomly sampled from 
a uniform distribution with a minimum of 445 cm2 and a maximum 
of 535 cm2 19 and is informed by the values from the Environmental 
Protection Agency, USA’s Exposure Factors Handbook.38 The ex-
pected inactivation of the virus during this contact assumed a single 
second contact, and the final kh value used in the care episode sim-
ulation was used. Δt represents the time between the doffing and 
touching the mucosa. A total of 10 000 parameter combinations are 
obtained for each care type scenario in a Monte Carlo framework.
2.9  |  Dose– response
Due to the lack of dose- response curve data for SARS- CoV- 2, an 
exact beta- Poisson dose– response curve39 was fitted to pooled 
data for SARS- CoV- 1 and HCoV 229E, assuming the infectivity of 
SARS- CoV- 2 lies between the infectivity for these two organisms. 
In Equation (6), 1F1(,  +  , − d) is the “Kummer confluent hyper-
geometric function” and P(d) is the probability of infection risk given 
dose39:
Ten- thousand bootstrapped pairs of α and β were produced 
based on a maximum likelihood estimation fit. For each estimated 
dose, an α and β pair were randomly sampled, and an infection risk 
was estimated with Equation (6). The infectious dose for 50% of in-
fections to occur was between 5 and 100 infectious viral particles 
with a mean of 30; the dose– response curve can be seen in Figure 1. 
We use this dose- response curve within the discussion section as a 
comparator against the curve for HCoV229E also given in Ref. [39] 
which is considered a similar but more infectious virus.
2.10  |  Sensitivity analysis
Spearman correlation coefficients were used to quantify mono-
tonic relationships between input variables and viral exposure. This 
method has been used in other QMRA studies to evaluate the rela-
tionship between model inputs and outputs.22,40,41
3  |  RESULTS
Surface contact pattern predictions varied by care type. IV care 
resulted in the highest number of surface contacts (mean = 23, 
SD = 10) per episode, while observational care and doctors’ 
rounds had on average 14 (SD = 7) and 20 (SD = 6) contacts, re-
spectively. A stair plot showing an example HCW surface contact 
pattern derived from the Markov chain prediction can be seen in 
Figure 2.
3.1  |  Estimated dose
Dose values in Table 2 and Figure 3 are given in a number of virus 
plaque- forming units (PFU), where we also include all fractional val-
ues since these would correspond to multiple viruses for a higher 
surface load relating to different SARS CoV2 variants.
Median PFU values for each care type were within the same 
order of magnitude (see Table 2), while maximum values for IV 
drip were 47% higher than for observations and 68% than for Drs’ 
rounds which can be explained by the number of surface contacts 
(IV- drip care: 23 ± 10, doctors’ rounds: 14 ± 7 and observational 
care: 20 ± 6). Doubling patient load, regardless of COVID- 19 prev-
alence, probability of self- inoculation or care type, caused median 
viral dose to increase by an order of magnitude from 0.0004PFUs 
to 0.0069PFUs (95%CI = 0 to 0.501PFU). Figure 3 shows a bar chart 
with standard deviations for care type, COVID- 19 prevalence on the 
ward, and chance of self- contamination.
A linear regression of dose on all predictor variables conducted 
in R (version 4.0.1) shows that dose does not track linearly with 
COVID- 19 prevalence (p < 0.001), where the median dose received 
during 100% COVID- 19 prevalence was an order of magnitude 
higher than at 50% (0.008 PFU vs. 0.031PFU) and 0PFU aftercare 
with a ward of 5% COVID- 19 patients.
(6)P(d) = 1−1F1(,  +  , − d)
F I G U R E  1  Dose- response risk curve for averaged SARS CoV- 1 
and Coronavirus 229E response
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Spearman correlation coefficients for input parameters vs. viral 
dose received are given in Table 2. In terms of most important fac-
tors determining exposure, surface cleanliness was found to be the 
single most important, with hand- to- mouth/eyes/nose transfer ef-
ficiency only half as important (correlation coefficient ρ = 0.29 vs. 
ρ = 0.12, respectively) (see Table 3). Surface concentration relates 
to cleaning frequency; hence, the control case was run for half the 
surface bioburden.
4  |  DISCUSSION
4.1  |  Key findings and generalizability
The model developed in this study indicates that the exposure from 
mistakes after doffing PPE is likely to be low for a single shift, even 
for nurses on 100% patient COVID- 19 positive wards. Exposure 
doses vary by care type as greater frequencies of surface con-
tacts directly impact viral loading on gloves and subsequent self- 
contamination exposures. The dose increases further if error rates 
in doffing are high and a high proportion of patients are COVID- 19 
positive (Figure 3), which highlights the importance of optimal hand 
hygiene, especially after PPE doffing.
Surface cleanliness was the most important factor in predicting 
dose regardless of doffing mistake likelihood, highlighting the rele-
vance of frequency of cleaning regimes for managing risk. Halving 
the surface viral concentration decreased the exposure twofold. 
Studies have shown that microorganisms can be readily transferred 
between touch sites in a healthcare environment by routine activi-
ties.42 Dispersion of respiratory droplets and aerosols may contami-
nate less frequently touched surfaces as well, particularly where the 
patient is undergoing treatment that generates aerosols such as con-
tinuous positive airway (CPAP) ventilation. Sampling in COVID- 19 
wards suggests aerosol deposition is a contributor to surface con-
tamination, as one study has reported deposition at a distance of 3m 
from the patient.11 Previous experimental work aerosolizing bacteria 
in an air- conditioned hospital room test chamber showed that sur-
faces well outside the patient zone can become contaminated with 
infectious material.43,44 Since the observational study underlying 
the Markov chains reveals that at least 10% of staff contacts impact 
on such surfaces (excluding door handles), then the current lists of 
high- touch surfaces45 that had historically been prioritized for clean-
ing, may need to be revised.
A dose- response curve for SARS- CoV- 2 is not yet available; 
furthermore, the contribution of each dose (i.e., upper respiratory 
vs. lower respiratory route) to individual infection risk may still be 
unclear even if and when it is obtained.46 Consequently, we have 
analyzed the results from the contact model based on relative ex-
posures and qualitative trends to try and understand the effect of 
key parameters and mitigation strategies. In Figure 4, we plotted the 
risk [0– 1] for each of the doses that the nurses received. We com-
pare the prediction between the Beta Poisson dose- response curve 
presented above against that for HCoV229E. We also follow the ap-
proach from Lei et al. and assume that the dose required for infec-
tion from the upper respiratory tract relating to a mucosal contact 
is 100 times higher than a dose reaching the lower respiratory tract.
In general, the mean risk is higher than the upper quartile allud-
ing to the hypothesis that a few nurses may become infected which 
relates to opportunistic or rare events under these circumstances. 
Using a Bernoulli distribution with either a 1 or a 0 response, repre-
senting an infection or not from each one of the predicted exposure 
doses and corresponding individual infection risk probabilities, we 
can predict the number of nurses infected per 100 nurses.
F I G U R E  2  Stair plot of example HCW 
surface contacts during care, where 
“patient” is a hand- to- patient contact; 
“out” and “in” are exit and entrance 
into the patient room, respectively; 
“FarPatient” is a hand- to- far patient 
surface contact; and “Equipment” is a 














TA B L E  2  PFU doses for each care type
Quantile IV care Observations
DRS' 
rounds
0% 0 0 0
25% 0 0 0
50% 0.00184 0.0021 0.00127
75% 0.0751 0.0651 0.0409
95% 0.506 0.421 0.234
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From the individual risks predicted using the Beta- Poisson curve 
and under a baseline assumption of 5% COVID- 19 positive patients, 
14 care episodes, 10% chance of self- inoculation, we see that 1 
nurse is likely to become infected with another 1 possible based 
on the mean and standard deviations obtained from 100 Bernoulli 
simulation runs. Under the worst- case scenario which could be 
roughly interpreted as an out- of- control epidemic in the community 
(100% COVID- 19 patients, 14 care episodes, 80% chance of self- 
inoculation), this mean increases to 4 per 100 with a standard devi-
ation of 4 infections.
The results in Figure 4 are illustrative to demonstrate the po-
tential variability in infection risk that could result from exposures 
during a shift, but it is important to recognize that analysis of infec-
tion risk also needs to be interpreted in the context of the current 
status of the pandemic within a particular country or region. The 
emergence of more transmissible variants is already changing the 
exposure- risk relationships, and it is likely that dose- response will 
be specific to a particular variant. The risk of infection will also be 
substantially impacted by the vaccination status within a commu-
nity. At the time of writing, 45 million people had received the first 
F I G U R E  3  Bar chart showing dose per 
shift for IV, observations, and doctors’ 
rounds for different COVID patient 
loads. Error bars represent the standard 





Concentration on surfaces (viral particles/cm2) 0.27
Transfer efficiency to mouth, eyes, or noseb 0.08
Transfer efficiency surface to hand 0.03
Transfer efficiency hand to surface 0.01
Inactivation constant for surfaces −0.02
Fraction of total hand surface area in contact −0.02
Fraction of RNA relating to infectious particlesa 0.04
Fraction of total hand surface area used in hand- to- face contactb 0.03
Total hand surface areab 0.02
Inactivation constant for hands 0.02
aThe spearman correlation coefficient represents instances where contacts with surfaces that had 
non- zero concentrations were made.
bThe spearman correlation coefficient represents instances in which these parameters were used 
in a simulation where a contaminated hand- to- face contact was made after doffing.
TA B L E  3  Spearman correlation 
coefficients of input parameters with 
infection risk
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vaccine dose and 34 million, the second dose in the UK, which will 
substantially reduce the likelihood of infection further than those 
illustrated here.
Regardless of the number of COVID- 19- positive patients on a 
ward, notable decreases in predicted infection risk were associated 
with less self- contamination during doffing. For example, for sce-
narios involving all COVID- 19 patients, the mean infection risk for 
10% probability of self- contamination while doffing was 0.4%, while 
the mean infection risk for an 80% probability of self- contamination 
while doffing was more than a 420% increase at 2.1%. This empha-
sizes the importance of adequate training for PPE use. Less risk of 
self- contamination will decrease the transmission risks, potentially 
through sanitizing gloves with alcohol gel before doffing. PPE can 
be an effective strategy for mitigating exposure if proper doffing 
techniques are used. In addition to training, improvements in PPE 
design that enhance safety and expediency of doffing may lower 
self- contamination rates and, therefore, improve PPE as a mitiga-
tion strategy.47 For example, fasteners or ties on gowns/masks were 
identified as “doffing barriers” because it was unclear whether these 
were to be untied and there were difficulties in reaching these ties. 
Self- contamination due to gowns and masks was not specifically ad-
dressed in this model. It is possible that self- contamination during 
doffing of items other than gloves could increase the potential risks 
due to incorrect doffing. Shortages of PPE have changed the normal 
practice where PPE is worn on a sessional basis rather than renewed 
for each patient. This means less doffing and potentially less auto- 
contamination but may increase the risk of virus transfer within the 
unit.
In addition to the importance of safe and proper doffing, the re-
sults from this computational study also emphasize the importance 
of surface decontamination and environmental monitoring strate-
gies. The concentration of virus on surfaces was the most influen-
tial parameter on the dose, which is consistent with other surface 
exposure studies.22 While SARS- CoV- 2 RNA has been detected on 
surfaces, one limitation to a molecular approach is the lack of infor-
mation regarding infectivity. In a recent study by Zhou et al. (2020), 
no surface samples demonstrated infectivity. However, it was noted 
that the concentrations of SARS- CoV- 2 on the surfaces were below 
the current detection limits for culture methodologies.32 While 
there are known relationships between cycle threshold values and 
probabilities of detecting a viable virus in a sample,48,49 it is neces-
sary to know what fraction of detected genome copies relate to viral 
particles for QMRAs. More data are needed to better understand 
how molecular concentrations, even concentrations below detec-
tion limits, relate to infectivity and subsequent infection risk.
4.2  |  Model uncertainties
The model in this study only evaluates a surface transmission route 
while in reality, risks posed to healthcare workers are due to com-
bined exposure pathways: air, droplet, person- to- person, and sur-
face transmission. As the model only evaluates surface transmission, 
these infection risks are likely to be an underestimate of the total risk 
incurred by the healthcare workers over an entire shift. In a study of 
healthcare workers in a facility in Wuhan, China, 1.1% (110/9684) 
were COVID- 19 positive.53 According to CDC, from February 12– 
April 9, 2020, 19% (9282/49 370) of COVID- 19 US cases for which 
healthcare professional status was available, were healthcare work-
ers.54 However, it is not known how many shifts were associated 
with these infection rates. Additionally, we assumed that wards with 
non- COVID- 19 patients did not have SARS- CoV- 2 contamination on 
surfaces, due to lack of data on SARS- CoV- 2 surface contamination 
beyond COVID- 19 wards or patient rooms. There is a potential for 
asymptomatically infected healthcare workers to contribute to envi-
ronmental contamination, especially when considering the relatively 
long shedding durations for asymptomatic infections.55 Infected 
healthcare workers and environmental contamination could be con-
sidered in future extensions of this model.
The fact that the proportions of healthcare workers with 
COVID- 19 discussed above are much larger than the infection risks 
estimated suggest that other transmission routes could drive addi-
tional HCW cases. This would include more transmission through air-
borne routes, or HCW to HCW transmission by asymptomatic cases 
outside the COVID- 19 care environment.56 However, while there 
continues to be disagreement over the contribution of each route to 
overall risk, transmission routes influence each other, making them 
all significant in healthcare environments. For example, surfaces can 
become contaminated due to the deposition of aerosolized virus. 
Viruses can later be resuspended from surfaces, contributing to air 
F I G U R E  4  Boxplot showing Infection 
risk (i.e., individual probability of infection 
for each predicted dose), using the Beta- 
Poisson and HCoV- 229E exponential 
dose- response curve.46 Triangles 
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contamination. Future work should extend current models with a 
multi- exposure pathway approach. This will advance not only our 
understanding of SARS- CoV- 2 transmission but the transmission of 
pathogens in built environments as a whole.
It should be noted that there is still a large variation in gowns 
and masks and that there is the possibility of double gloving; hence, 
potentially reducing the risk of self- contamination and the type of 
material and the design will also to an extent, determine the con-
tamination risk.
Finally, a dose– response curve informed by SARS- CoV- 1 and 
HCoV- 229E data was utilized, due to the lack of SARS- CoV- 2- 
specific dose- response data. Despite limitations related to the dose- 
response, the conclusions from the estimated doses were consistent 
with the insights from infection risk estimates. Increases in the prob-
ability of contamination between care episodes related to increases 
in the dose and most notably, for scenarios in which more than 5% of 
patients had COVID- 19 (Figure 3).
5  |  CONCLUSION
We propose a model for predicting exposure to healthcare work-
ers from self- contamination during the doffing of personal pro-
tective equipment over a single shift. The model estimates the 
quantity of SARS- CoV- 2 virus accretion on gloved hands for three 
types of non- aerosol- generating procedures: IV- care, observa-
tions, and doctors’ rounds. Once doffing was in progress, staff 
self- contaminated a fraction of the times based on patient- load 
fatigue. Three COVID- 19 positive patient scenarios (5%, 50%, and 
100% COVID- 19 patients) were investigated amounting to a total 
of 30 000 parameter combinations allowing us to conduct a “what-
 if” parametric study and sensitivity analysis. Surface viral concen-
tration was found to be more than twice as important as any other 
factor whereby highlighting the importance of time- appropriate 
cleaning. Transfer efficiency from finger to the nose was of sec-
ondary importance, although hand hygiene following doffing is still 
highly recommended. While the exposure from this type of self- 
contamination is low per healthcare worker shift, this highlights 
that the procedures, if carried out correctly, are generally safe. It 
is accepted that other routes of transmission will play a significant 
role in infection propagation.
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